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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON PETTTION FOR REHEARING
The sole issue presented in this petition for rehearing
is whether the Court overlooked a material issue pertaining to
proposed remedial measures to be taken on remand of this case to
ensure both parties a fair trial or fair capital sentencing
proqeedingsr to wit:

recusal of the Honorable J. Harlan Burns

from all further proceedings on this case.

-iii-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OP UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.

:

Case No. 20265

.

DOUGLAS EDWARD KAY,
Defendant-Appellant.

:
:

P r i o r i t y No. 1

RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT QF THE CASE
This is a petition for rehearing of a decision filed by
this Court on March 7, 1986, in an interlocutory appeal in a
capital case from an order of the district judge vacating the
condition of conditional guilty pleas which had previously been
unilaterally presented to the district judge by the defense and
which had been accepted and entered by the court.

The terms of

the pleas were that the defendant would plead guilty to all
charges including three counts of first degree murder and four
counts of aggravated robbery upon the condition that he would not
receive the death penalty on the capital murder charges (R. II,
159).
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS
For purposes of addressing the narrow issue presented
in this petition for rehearing, the State agrees with the

fact

statements set forth in the Courtfs opinion in State v. Kay,
P.2d

, No. 20265, slip op. (Otah, filed March 7, 1986)

(attached as Appendix A ) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Court's opinion i n S t a t e v . Kay.

p.2d

,

No. 20265, s l i p op, (Utah, f i l e d March 7 , 1986), does not address

an issue raised by the State, the resolution of which i s
e s s e n t i a l to ensure the defendant's and the S t a t e 1 s rights to
fain proceedings upon remand of t h i s case for further
proceedings, and to restore public confidence in those
proceedings.

The State contended in i t s i n i t i a l brief on appeal

that if t h i s Court affirmed the lower court 1 s order vacating the
condition of defendant's guilty pleas, then the remedial relief
of directing that a new judge hear a l l future proceedings on t h i s
case was necessary to ensure the fairness of those proceedings
for a l l parties and restore public confidence in them.

This

Court has now affirmed the lower court's order; has held that the
t r i a l judge violated the procedural requirements of Rule 11 of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure when he entertained and
accepted the defendant's unilateral plea (a rule aimed, in part,
at preserving the i n t e g r i t y of the judicial process); and has
ordered the case remanded for further proceedings.

However, the

Court has not addressed the question of recusal of the t r i a l
judge.

Resolution of t h i s issue i s necessary for a complete and

proper disposition of t h i s case.
TNTRQDDOTION

Rule 35(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, alludes
to grounds for rehearing as follows:
The petition shall state with particularity the points of law or fact which the
petitioner claims the Court has overlooked
or misapprehended. . . .
-2-

In Brown Y. PlCkardr denying reh'g. 4 Utah 292, 11 P.
512 (1886), this Court elaborated on the standard for rehearing:
We must be convinced that the court failed

to consider some material point in the case/
or that it erred in its conclusions, or
that some matter has been discovered which
was unknown at the time of the hearing.
.(em^asis added)

4 Utah at 294, 11 P. at 512 (citation omitted).

in Cummings v. Nielson. 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1913) , the Court
stated:
[A] rehearing should not be applied for,
unless we have misconstrued or overlooked
some material fact or facts, or have overlooked some statute or decision which may
affect the result, or that we have based
the decision on some wrong principle of law,
or have either misapplied or overlooked
something which materially affects the result
....
If there are some reasons, however,
such as we have indicated above, or other
good reasons, a petition for a rehearing
should be promptly filed and, if it is
meritorious, its form will in no case be
scrutinized by this court.
42 Utah at 172-73, 129 P. at 624.

The argument portion of this

brief will demonstrate that the Court overlooked a material point
in its decision which warrants the granting of the State1s
petition for rehearing.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT OVERLOOKED A MATERIAL ISSUE
ON THIS APPEAL WHEN IT FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE,
ADDRESS AND RESOLVE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER
ALL FUTURE PROCEEDINGS IN THIS CASE SHOULD
BE HEARD BY A NEW JUDGE TO ENSURE FAIRNESS
TO ALL PARTIES AND RESTORE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE
IN THE PROCEEDINGS.
In the initial briefing of this case, the State
asserted that should this Court affirm the lower court's order
-3-

(which vacated the condition of defendant's guilty pleas and
allowed defendant to either stand on his guilty pleas without
the condition or withdraw his guilty pleas and proceed to t r i a l ) ,
then certain remedial measures would be necessary to ensure the
defendant a f a i r t r i a l or the State a f a i r capital sentencing
proceeding, and to restore public confidence in the proceedings.
Recusal of the t r i a l judge from a l l future proceedings was
asserted as being e s s e n t i a l to a proper disposition of t h i s case.
(Respondent's brief, Point IC at pp. 34-39, reprinted as Appendix
B below)• 1
The Court has now affirmed the lower court's order.
In doing so f the Court found error when defense counsel proposed
a plea bargain to the t r i a l court without f i r s t obtaining the
S t a t e ' s consent f concluding that:
Under Rule 11 [Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure], the plea should not have been
tendered to the judge unless the State had
previously agreed to its terms. On the
record before us, there is no evidence that
the prosecutor at any time expressly agreed
to the terms of the pleaf much less that
he agreed to the plea prior to its presentation to the judge.
State v. Kay,

P.2d

filed March 7, 1986).

, No. 20265f slip op. at 16 (Utah,
The Court also expressly held that the

1

The State also requested that t h i s Court order the remedial
measure of precluding the State from using the defendant's
confession (given during the proceedings when the t r i a l judge
accepted defendant's conditional guilty plea) at any subsequent
t r i a l to preserve defendant's due process rights should he choose
to withdraw his guilty pleas and proceed to t r i a l .
(Respondent's
brief, Point IIB at 4 6 ) . This Court agreed and adopted t h i s
remedial measure in i t s decision. £ayr s l i p op. at 17-18.
However, the Court has f a i l e d to address the additional measure
of the t r i a l judge's recusal.

-4-

t r i a l judge v i o l a t e d t h e procedural requirements of Rule 11 of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure when he e n t e r t a i n e d and
accepted t h e defendant's u n i l a t e r a l p l e a .
(Otah, f i l e d March 7 1986).

Kay, s l i p op. at 2 , 16

This Court concluded t h a t :

The t r i a l court a l s o erred by e n t e r t a i n ing the p l e a . After the motion t o enter a
plea was presented t o i t f and before proceeding
with the i n camera hearing, the court should
have a s c e r t a i n e d whether the prosecutor had
agreed t o the proposed p l e a . If i t determined
that the prosecutor had not agreed in advance,
the court should have terminated the hearing
and any further c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the p l e a .
Kay, s l i p op. a t 16.
The above errors of the defense and t h e t r i a l
were found to be c l e a r v i o l a t i o n s of Rule 1 1 .

judge

This Court

recognized t h a t Rule 11 i s aimed, in part, at preserving the
i n t e g r i t y of the j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s , t h a t i t d e l i n e a t e s proper
standards of conduct for t r i a l c o u r t s in connection with plea
bargaining, and t h a t i t bars the t r i a l c o u r t 1 s p a r t i c i p a t i o n in
plea d i s c u s s i o n s prior t o any agreement being made by the
prosecuting attorney because such p a r t i c i p a t i o n may undermine the
j u d g e ' s proper function as a neutral a r b i t e r and transform him
i n t o an advocate for whatever proposed r e s o l u t i o n the judge
favors.

ILax, s l i p op. at 6 - 7 .
Because t h i s Court has found a c l e a r v i o l a t i o n of Rule

11 by the t r i a l judge, a l l of the grounds for recusal a s s e r t e d at
pages 34-39 of the S t a t e 1 s i n i t i a l brief
brief)

(Appendix B of t h i s

remain v i a b l e , are hereby r e - a s s e r t e d , and should be

addressed by t h i s Court.

£££ a l s o the S t a t e 1 s A p p l i c a t i o n for

Order of Recusal and Change of Judge and Memorandum i n Support

-5-

thereof (R. Ill, at 29-53).

The remedial measure of recusal is

essential to ensure the fairness of future proceedings for all
parties regardless of whether the case proceeds directly to a
capital sentencing proceeding (should defendant choose to stand
on his guilty plea), or proceeds to trial where the defendant may
choqTse trial by judge or jury, and if convicted, further choose a
capital sentencing hearing by judge or jury*

Such remedial

relief is also essential to restore public confidence in the
proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing. Respondent submits this Court
has not considered a material point in this case by not
acknowledging, addressing or attempting to resolve the question
of whether all future proceedings should be heard by a new trial
judge.

Respondent requests that the Court's opinion be

supplemented and modified accordingly.
The State certifies that this petition is presented in
good faith, for the reasons set out herein, and not for purposes
of delay.
DATED this «?P

day of March, 1986.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General

-6-
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ADDENDUM
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APPENDIX A

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

No. 20265
•:

v.
Douglas Edward Kay,
Defendant and Appellant.

F

J

L

£

D

March 7, 1986
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Defendant Douglas Kay appeals from the trial court's
refusal to adhere to the terms of a plea bargain. He pleaded
guilty to three counts of capital homicide in exchange for a
promise that he would be sentenced to life imprisonment
rather than death. The trial court accepted the pleas
without objection from the State. Two weeks later, following
a change in the State's position, the court ruled that it was
not bound by the agreement to impose life imprisonment. The
court gave Kay the option of being sentenced, with the possibility of receiving the death sentence, or withdrawing his
guilty pleas. Kay took an interlocutory appeal and seeks
specific enforcement of the plea bargain. He alleges not
only that principles of double jeopardy preclude the court
from setting the pleas aside and forcing him to begin the
process anew, but also that the trial court's actions
violated his constitutional right to due process. For
reasons unique to the facts of this case, we find no
constitutional infirmity in the trial court's setting aside
the condition of the pleas. The case therefore is remanded.
Kay may withdraw his pleas of guilty or he may proceed to
sentencing.
This appeal presents several issues. The first is
whether the Utah statute governing the sentencing of capital
felons, U.C.A., 1953, § 76-3-207 (Repl. Vol. 8B, 1978, &
Supp. 1985), permits a defendant to plead guilty to a capital
felony in exchange for a promise of life imprisonment. The
second issue is whether a violation of Rule 11 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-11 (Repl.
Vol. 8C, 1982, Supp. 1985)—either because of the trial
judge's participation in the plea process or because the plea
was conditional in nature—requires the plea to be set aside.
The third issue is whether the acceptance of a plea agreement
that is subsequently broken places a defendant in jeopardy

and precludes trial. Finally, we must determine what constraints due process places on the State when it seeks to
breach a plea agreement.
We hold that neither the statute governing the
sentencing of capital felons nor Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure prevented Kay from entering and the trial
judge from accepting the conditional plea presented here. We
hold that the trial judge did violate the procedural requirements of Rule 11 when he accepted Kay's unilateral plea, but
find that the violation did not render the plea agreement
invalid. We also hold that while Kay was placed in jeopardy
within the meaning of the fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution, the trial judge was entitled to rescind his
acceptance of the agreement under the circumstances of this
case, and neither double jeopardy nor due process considerations bar the State from proceeding to trial.
The facts leading up to this appeal are relatively
simple. Kay is charged with three counts of first degree
murder, all capital felonies, and four counts of aggravated
robbery, all first degree felonies. These charges arose out
of the execution-style shooting deaths of three people during
the robbery of a bar in Cedar City, Utah, in February of
1984.* Kay was arraigned on April 17, 1984, and again on
May 8th. A number of pretrial motions were presented throughout the summer. The trial was originally scheduled for
August 13, 1984, but at the State's request, was continued
until September 17th.
Three weeks before trial, defendant's counsel
presented the court with an "In-Camera Motion for Conditional
Plea of Guilty" in which Kay offered to plead guilty to all
counts and to give his confession in open court in exchange
for a promise by the judge that he would not be sentenced to
death. Although the State had two days' notice that Kay
intended to enter a conditional plea, it was unaware of the
terms of the proposed plea until the motion was presented to
the court.
The motion was presented to the court in chambers
and was discussed at length off the record. The judge,
defendant's counsel, the Iron County attorney, and a Utah
assistant attorney general were all present. A one-hour
recess was then called to allow the State to consider the
matter and to allow defense counsel to consult with Kay.
Following another brief in camera session with all counsel,
proceedings were held on the record. The court questioned
Tl Three other defendants were involved in the robbery. The
State granted immunity to two of them in exchange for their
testimony against Kay and the remaining defendant.

No. 20265-
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Kay at length about his understanding of both the plea agreement and its consequences and concluded that the pleas were
knowingly and voluntarily given. Kay then pleaded guilty to
each count of capital homicide "on the condition that [his]
life not be forfeited,* pleaded guilty to all four counts of
aggravated robbery, and gave a full confession on the record,
describing the robbery and the murders in detail. The trial
judge accepted the pleas and scheduled a sentencing hearing
for September 17, 1984. At no time did the prosecution
object in open court to the pleas or to any other aspect of
the proceedings.
Two weeks later, the State asked the trial court to
reconsider its acceptance of the conditional pleas. This
motion was made after a new lawyer appeared as lead counsel
for the State, after the details of Kay's confession had been
widely reported in the media, and after several public
demonstrations in Cedar City had protested the agreement to
sentence Kay to life imprisonment. One such incident involved
parading an effigy of Kay crowned with the head of a dead pig
through the town with a placard calling for the recall of the
trial judge in the upcoming elections.
Following a lengthy hearing on the State's motion to
reconsider, the trial judge entered an order vacating the
promise of life imprisonment. He gave several reasons for
his action. First, he found that the State had been surprised
by the original motion for the conditional guilty plea, had
disagreed with the plea agreement (despite its failure to
object on the record), and had not had sufficient time to
respond to Kay's request for a conditional plea. In addition, he found that the conditional plea was illegal and that
accepting it would constitute plain error. The trial judge
gave Kay the option of standing on the guilty pleas and facing
a sentencing proceeding at which the death penalty might be
imposed; withdrawing the guilty pleas, reinstating the not
guilty pleas, and going to trial; or pursuing an interlocutory
appeal. Kay chose the last alternative.
In this Court, Kay seeks specific enforcement of
the plea agreement. Kay asserts that the trial court did not
exceed its authority in accepting the pleas and that, in any
event, the State's failure to timely object precludes it from
challenging them now. He argues that the trial court's
actions violated his constitutional right not to be placed
twice in jeopardy, as well as his due process right to a
fair, speedyf and public trial.
The State contends that the trial judge properly
vacated the promise of life imprisonment because conditional
and unilateral pleas are unlawful and therefore void under
both the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and the death
penalty statute. In response to Kay's constitutional

3
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arguments, the State asserts that because the conditional
pleas were void, Kay was not placed in jeopardy. In addition,
the State argues that because Kay acted improperly in offering
the guilty pleas, he cannot now complain that the resulting
publicity and delay deny him due process.
I
We first consider Utah's death penalty statute to
determine whether it permits a trial judge to accept a guilty
plea conditioned upon the judge's promise not to impose the
death penalty. In capital cases, trials are bifurcated: the
defendant's guilt or innocence is determined in the first
phase, while the penalty of death or life imprisonment is
determined in the second. U.C.A., 1953, §§ 76-3-206 and -207
(Repl. Vol. 8B, 1978, & Supp. 1985).
This bifurcated scheme was adopted by Utah in 1973
in response to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman held that the
death penalty was prohibited by the cruel and unusual punishment provisions of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to
the United States Constitution when the decision to impose
the penalty was left to the "uncontrolled discretion of
judges or juries." 408 U.S. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Following Furman, the Georgia legislature amended its death
penalty statute, bifurcating the guilt and penalty phases and
specifying detailed standards to guide the fact finder in
deciding between death and life imprisonment in the penalty
phase. The Supreme Court reviewed this amended statute and
held that it was not per se unconstitutional. Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976). The Georgia statute
upheld in Gregg is essentially identical to Utah's death
penalty statute, which we have also upheld against constitutional challenge. State v. Pierre, Utah, 572 P.2d 1338, 1345
(1977), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978).
As enacted in 1973, Utah's death penalty statute
required a separate sentencing proceeding only for capital
felons found guilty after trial. In 1983, however, the
legislature amended the law to require a separate sentencing
proceeding for those who plead guilty, as well as for those
who are convicted by a judge or jury after trial. 1983 Utah
Laws, ch. 19, § 1; U.C.A., 1953, § 76-3-207(1) (Repl. Vol. 8B,
1978, Supp. 1985). No legislative history exists to explain
this change.
The language of the sentencing statute, section
76-3-207, provides as follows:
(1) When a defendant has pled guilty
to or been found guilty of a capital
felony, there shall be further proceedings
No. 20265
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before the court or jury on the issue of
sentence. . . .
(2) In these sentencing proceedings,
evidence may be presented as to any matter
the court deems relevant to sentence,
including but not limited to the nature
and cirexamstances of the crime, the
defendant's character, background,
history, mental and physical condition,
and any other facts in aggravation or
mitigation of the penalty.

(3) [Thereafter, t]he court or jury,
as the case may be, shall retire to
consider the penalty. . . .
U.C.A., 1953, § 76-3-207(1), (2), and (3) (Repl. Vol. 8Bf
1978, Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). Arguably, this mandate
of a hearing requiring consideration of the evidence to determine the proper sentence is meaningless if the judge can bind
himself in advance to impose a particular sentence. Therefore,, the State argues, we should construe the statute to
preclude the judge from accepting any plea that would limit
his discretion in the sentencing proceeding. This argument
is without merit.
The bifurcated sentencing procedure was instituted
to insure that if a defendant is found guilty and then
sentenced to death, the sentence will withstand scrutiny
under both the state and federal constitutions. See
generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The
statute's aim was to eliminate the arbitrariness of the
decision to impose death. It did this by requiring the court
or the jury to carefully weigh specific aggravating and
mitigating circumstances before deciding upon the appropriate
sentence. Id. We can infer that the legislature requires
the bifurcated proceeding for those who plead guilty to
capital crimes in order to assure that if the death sentence
is imposed, it is no more arbitrary than a death sentence
imposed after a full trial.
Arguably, allowing the judge to agree to forego the
death penalty without first considering the kind of detailed
information normally presented at a sentencing proceeding
renders the sentencing scheme unconstitutionally arbitrary.
This argument is not persuasive. Some discretion is always
present in the operation of a death penalty statute. The
prosecution always has discretion to decide whom to charge
with a capital felony. It may also bargain that charge down
to a lesser offense, even after the charge is filed.

5
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Similarly, under our sentencing statute, nothing prevents a
prosecutor from refusing to put on evidence of aggravating
circumstances, thus effectively insuring that a defendant
will not receive the death penalty.2 U.C.A., 1953,
§ 76-3-207(2) (Repl. Vol. 8B, 1978, Supp. 1985).
Under these circumstances, permitting the trial
judge to accept a guilty plea conditioned upon an agreement
not to impose the death penalty does not significantly
increase the potential for arbitrariness in administering the
death sentence. It does not therefore raise questions of a
constitutional magnitude under Furman v. Georgia, supra.
Although a sentencing hearing must be held, nothing in the
sentencing statute precludes the trial court from agreeing in
advance, under the terms of a proper plea agreement, to
impose a particular sentence. In light of these considerations, we find that the statute provides no basis for
upholding the trial court's subsequent withdrawal from the
agreement.
II
The State next argues that the trial court's failure
to comply with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
renders Kay's bargain invalid. U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-11
(Repl. Vol. 8C, 1982, Supp. 1985). Our Rule 11 is closely
patterned after Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure as that rule existed when the Utah rules were first
formulated. The primary purpose of the federal rule and, we
must assume, the comparable state rule, is to insure that
when a defendant enters a guilty plea and thereby waives
important constitutional rights, such as the right to a jury
trial, he or she acts freely and voluntarily, with full
knowledge of the consequences of the plea. E.g., McCarthy
v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969). To this end,
subpart (a) of Utah's Rule 11 provides that a defendant shall
be represented by counsel before a plea is taken, unless counsel is waived, and subparts (b), (c), and (e) describe in
detail the procedures for taking pleas of guilty or no
contest.
A second purpose of Rule 11, aimed at preserving the
integrity of the judicial process, is to insure that the
record reflects that the plea was properly taken, i.e., that
the judge correctly determined the terms of the plea agreement
and whether the plea was voluntary. See, e.g., United Stages
v. Roberts, 570 F.2d 999 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Thus, the r u l ^
delineates proper standards of conduct for trial courts in
connection with plea bargaining, requiring them to determine
T.
In some states, prosecutors are statutorily required to
introduce evidence of aggravating circumstances. See, e.g.,
N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3(d)(1982 ed.).
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whether a plea agreement has been reached between the defendant and the prosecution and, if so, the details of that
agreement. U.C.A., 1953# § 77-35-ll(e)(6) (Repl. Vol. 8C,
1982, Supp. 1985). In addition, the court must inform the
defendant that it is not bound by the prosecutor's agreement
to request or recommend a specific sentence. Id. Finally,
Rule 11 bars the trial court's participation in plea discussions "prior to any agreement being made by the prosecuting
attorney." The rule provides, however, that after such an
agreement is reached, the plea may be disclosed to the court,
which may then indicate to both parties whether the proposed
disposition will be approved. U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-ll(f)
(Repl. Vol. 8C, 1982, Supp. 1985). That portion of the rule
also provides that if the trial court thereafter decides not
to adhere to the terms of the agreement, it shall so advise
the defendant and allow the defendant to either affirm or
withdraw the plea.3 These provisions governing the trial
court's conduct attempt to insure that the trial court will
not improperly participate in the plea negotiations, the
possible consequence of such participation being to render
the plea involuntary and subject to subsequent attack.
United States v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 253 (S.D.N.Y.
1966). Such participation may also undermine the judge's
proper function as a neutral arbiter and transform him into
an advocate for whatever proposed resolution the judge favors.
United States v. Werker, 535 F.2d 198, 203 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert, denied, 429 U.S. 926 (1976).
Understanding these general principles is useful in
evaluating the State's contention that the trial court's
violation of Rule 11 renders Kay's plea invalid. The State
argues that the trial court violated Rule 11 in two
particulars. First, the State contends that because Rule 11
T". This provision in the Utah rules differs from Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in that the Utah rule
suggests that the trial court can withdraw from the plea
agreement even after a guilty plea has been formally accepted
and entered on the record. The federal rule, on the other
hand, permits a court to accept or reject a plea that is
conditioned upon an agreement as to a particular sentence.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3). If the court rejects the agreement, it must allow the defendant to withdraw the plea; if it
accepts the agreement, it is generally bound to adhere to the
terms of the agreement. United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d
1325, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The federal rule does not allow
a judge carte blanche authority to renege on a plea agreement
after the agreement has been accepted. Id. This power,
apparently granted by the Utah rule, to withdraw from a plea
agreement at any time should not be taken literally. In
appropriate circumstances, due process and double jeopardy
considerations will prohibit the judge from reneging on the
agreement. See discussion in part III infra.

expressly allows a defendant only to enter a plea of "not
guilty, guilty or no contest," U.C.A., 1953, § 75-35-li(b)
(Repl. Vol. 8C, 1982, Supp. 1985), by implication the rule
does not permit the entry of a conditional guilty plea.
Second, the State argues that the trial court participated in
the plea agreement, contrary to the prohibitions against such
conduct in Rule 11(f). The State asserts that both errors
either require this Court to declare the guilty pleas a
nullity or allow the trial court to proceed with sentencing
without regard to the plea agreement.
We first address the State's argument that Rule 11
prohibited the trial court from accepting a guilty plea
conditioned upon an agreement not to impose the death penalty. Assuming arguendo that the State acquiesced in the
plea agreement,4 nothing in the specific language of the rule
prohibits a court from accepting or rejecting a plea agreement
that asks the court to commit itself in advance to imposing a
sentence lawfully within its power.5 On the other hand,
Utah's Rule 11 does not explicitly permit a judge to accept a
guilty plea conditioned upon the imposition of an agreed-upon
sentence. It is one thing to say that Rule 11 may not contemplate the trial court's acceptance of a guilty plea
conditioned upon a promise to impose a given sentence, or
that such a practice is unwise as a general policy, and an
entirely different thing to say that Utah's Rule 11 positively forbids it in all situations and that any resulting
plea is void.
Some cases under the old version of federal Rule 11
held that the rule flatly prohibited a trial court from
accepting a plea when the court made its intention respecting
sentencing clear prior to acceptance of the plea. See, e.g.,
United States v. Adams, 634 F.2d 830, 836 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Werker, supra, 535 F.2d at 201. In these
cases, however, the courts did not determine whether such a
plea was automatically a nullity.6 Conversely, some courts
Tl There is nothing in the record compiled before the trial
court indicating that the State did not agree to the plea
agreement. See discussion in part III infra.
5. In fact, subpart (e)(6), which requires the judge to
inform the defendant that the judge is not bound by any
recommendations of the prosecutor as to sentence, implicitly
recognizes that the judge must be able to exercise broad
discretion in sentencing. Although subpart (e)(6) insures
that the prosecutor cannot limit the trial judge's authority
in sentencing, it does not prohibit the judge from
independently exercising his discretion to commit himself to
imposing a particular sentence as a condition of a plea
agreement.
6. In Adams, the defendant had withdrawn his plea and
proceeded to trial. The appeals court held that he was
(Continued on page 9.)

held that the acceptance of a guilty plea conditioned upon an
agreement to impose a particular sentence did not render the
plea invalid. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357
(1978); United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir.
1982)? Toler v. Wyrick, 563 F.2d 372, 374-75 (8th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907 (1978). The current version of
Rule 11 in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
superseded the rule upon which Utah's Rule 11 is modeled, now
explicitly recognizes that a court may entertain a plea
bargain conditioned upon an agreement to impose a particular
sentence, although the court retains the discretion to refuse
to accept such a plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(2), 18 U.S.C.
(1983). The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal
Justice, discussing a judge's responsibilities when accepting
a guilty plea, recognizes that it may be both permissible and
desirable for a judge to disclose a proposed sentence as part
of the plea-bargaining process, so long as the judge acts as
a moderator and not as an advocate. Ill ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice § 14-3.3, at 84-85 (2d ed. 1980).
Utah's Rule 11 provides no such specific guidance.
Under the circumstances of this case, however, we cannot find
that the acceptance of the conditional plea was improper.
The policy considerations that have led some courts to hold
in specific factual settings that it is improper for a judge
to agree to impose a given sentence in exchange for the entry
of a guilty plea are not present in this case. The record
before us leaves no question that Kay's pleas were voluntary.
Kay vigorously argues that the pleas were freely and
knowingly given in an effort to avoid the death penalty. The
mere fact that Kay pleaded guilty to avoid a harsher penalty
does not render an otherwise valid plea involuntary. E.g.,
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749-50 (1970). As
noted above, nothing in our Rule 11 explicitly prohibits the
acceptance of such a conditional plea, and we decline to read
such a limiting provision into the rule.
We turn to the State's second contention regarding
Rule 11. It argues that the trial court's participation in
the plea discussions rendered the pleas invalid, particularly
where, as it contends occurred here, the trial court
negotiated with Kay over the State's objection. Rule 11
specifically provides that *[t]he judge shall not participate
in plea discussions prior to any agreement being made by the
prosecuting attorney . . . .* U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-ll(f)
(Repl. Vol. 8C, 1982, Supp. 1985). The corresponding federal
(Footnote 6 continued.)
entitled to be sentenced by another judge. In Werker, the
state obtained, upon proper objection and appeal, a writ of
mandamus to prohibit disclosure of the sentence to the
defendant.

rule has always contained a similar provision*
P. 11(e)(1), 18 U.S.C. (1983).

Fed. R. Crim.

As we previously noted, the trial court's
participation in plea negotiations is not to be encouraged;
there is a very real danger that a trial court's participation will have a coercive effect upon a defendant.
Certainly, a trial court's unilateral participation in a plea
negotiation over a prosecutor's objection is highly improper.
Despite the State's assertions to the contrary, however,
there is no substantial record evidence that this occurred
here. While Kay presented his agreement unilaterally to the
judge, the State's attorneys were present during all discussions on the plea. Nothing in the record suggests that the
State did not acquiesce in the agreement, nor does any record
evidence suggest that the judge's actions coerced Kay into
reluctantly entering the guilty pleas. For these reasons, we
cannot hold that this violation of Rule 11 requires that the
plea be declared a nullity.
A final word on the State's Rule 11 arguments. In
its zeal to set aside Kay's guilty pleas or renege on the
bargain that was struck, the State has argued, in effect,
that otherwise voluntary and lawful guilty pleas should
always be voided when the trial court violates any provision
of Rule 11. The concurring opinions of Chief Justice Hall
and Justice Howe adopt this reasoning as well. This position
is shortsighted, for to follow it would be to sanction a
remedy far worse than the wrong. If we were to hold that any
violation of Rule 11 automatically voids the resultant plea,
even when the plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered, we
would encourage defendants, convicted and sentenced after
such a plea, to attack their convictions for purely tactical
reasons, either by direct appeal or by seeking habeas corpus
long after the fact.7 We have refused to overturn convictions
upon such challenges in the past, e.g., State v. Knowles,
Utah, 709 P.2d 311 (1985); State v. Morris, Utah, 709 P.2d
310 (1985), and we find no reason to encourage such attacks
in the future.
Overturning such convictions—which we would have to
do if we embraced the rationale advanced by the State and the
Chief Justice's concurring opinion—would require the State
to reprosecute numerous defendants, probably long after the
challenged guilty pleas were entered and when the passage of
time would make reprosecution impractical, if not
TZ No data is available for Utah specifically, but studies
indicate that despite the proscriptions contained in the
federal rules and in most state rules, judicial involvement
in plea bargaining is widespread. Ill ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice § 14-3.3, at 84 (2d ed. 1980). Thus, the
potential for such attacks is substantial.
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impossible. Almost certainly, the ultimate result would be
to free a number of convicted persons for nothing more than
technical errors in the acceptance of their voluntary guilty
pleas.
Having concluded that violations of Rule 11 do not
automatically invalidate Kay's guilty pleas, the question
arises as to the consequences of Rule 11 violations* Rule 30
of Utah's Rules of Criminal Procedure, U.C.A.f 1953,
§ 77-35-30(a) (Repl. Vol. 8C, 1982), reflects our "harmless
error" rule, and we find it applicable to situations involving violations of Rule ll.8 Accordingly, a Rule 11 error
will not invalidate the plea taken unless the error results
in a substantial violation of a party's rights. In the
present case, we find no error that affects the substantial
rights of a party and, as to which, an objection was timely
raised. The State certainly had ample grounds for raising
objections at the time the plea was taken; however, it waived
those objections by its failure to raise them at the time the
pleas were accepted. Therefore, the Rule 11 violations
cannot be a basis for our invalidating the pleas.
Ill
We next turn to Kay's arguments concerning his
rights under a broken plea agreement. Kay first contends
that any attempt to try him or sentence him without respecting the terms of the plea agreement will violate his rights
under the state and federal constitutions not to be placed
twice in jeopardy. Kay relies on the almost universal
recognition that jeopardy attaches when a court accepts a
guilty plea, see, e.g., Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221
(1883); Cruz v. United States, 709 F.2d 111, 113 (1st Cir.
1983), and that the entry of the plea, rather than the actual
imposition of the sentence, is the critical moment for
determining jeopardy. See Annot, 75 A.L.R.2d 683; Stowers v.
State, 266 Ind. 403, 363 N.E.2d 978, 982 (1977).
8. In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), the
Supreme Court suggested that any violation of federal Rule 11
rendered a guilty plea void. Id. at 471-72. The rule was
thereafter amended to provide that variations from the
procedures outlined in the rule should be disregarded unless
the variation affected a defendant's substantial rights.
Rule 11(h); 11 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1985). The notes of the
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure state
that subsection (h) was added to clarify the fact that the
harmless error provision of Rule 52(a) applied to Rule 11
violations. We see no reason why the harmless error concept
should not also apply to Utah's analogue to federal Rule 11.
A party is no more entitled to a perfect plea proceeding than
he is to a perfect trial. See Warner v. Morris, Utah, 709
P.2d 309 (1985) (failure to follow letter of Rule 11 does not
render plea void).

The State, in responding to this claim, relies on
cases that have assumed, without directly addressing the
question, that the State's failure to adhere to a plea
bargain does not raise double jeopardy problems because the
State's noncompliance simply renders the plea void ab initio.
The apparent reasoning of these cases is that a plea agreement
based upon a promise which is later broken has been coerced
and is therefore void. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York#
404 U.S. 257 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); cf. Machibroda
v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962). Since jeopardy
does not attach when a plea is void, these cases reason that
the defendant may be tried without running afoul of the
constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. The
ALI's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedures § 350-6 and
the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure § 444(e)(2)(iii) make
the same analytic assumption.
That analysis, however, is not entirely
satisfactory. In an attempt to avoid freeing defendants who
plead guilty whenever the prosecutor or a judge later refuses
to comply with the terms of the plea agreement, these courts
have resorted to the fiction that the plea never occurred—
that it is "void ab initio." Yet at the time the plea was
taken, it certainly may have been knowing and voluntary, and
under accepted doctrine, nothing more is required to make
jeopardy attach at the time the plea is entered. This
approach also has practical flaws. While it permits a
defendant to be retried, it places no constraints on the
power of the State or the court to break a plea agreement with impunity. For that reason, the courts have had to
resort to notions of fundamental fairness under the due
process clause to construct some necessary protections for
the defendants' legitimate interests.
See part IV, infra.
The analytical and practical problems posed by the
void ab initio approach have led some courts to reject it.
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 534 F.2d 119, 121 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976); United States
v. Cruz, 709 F.2d 111, 113 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v.
Holman, 728 F.2d 809 (6th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 105 S.
Ct. 388 (1984); Myers v. Frazier, W. Va., 319 S.E.2d 782
(1984); cf. People v. Tourtellotte, 88 Wash. 2d 579, 564 P.2d
799 (1977). Because the entry of a plea constitutes a waiver
by the defendant of a number of important constitutional
rights, a trial court may not simply disregard a plea agreement unless the defendant knowingly waives his right to be
free from jeopardy through a voluntary withdrawal of the
plea. See, e.g., Stowers v. State, supra, 363 N.E.2d at
982-83.
In view of the conflict among the lower federal
courts, the disparate state court positions, and the absence
of a clear ruling by the United States Supreme Court, we do
No. 20265
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not feel compelled to adopt the strained void ab initio
analysis. Rather, we are persuaded by the First Circuit's
reasoning in United States v. Cruz, supra. In Cruz, the
trial court unconditionally accepted a defendant's guilty
plea to a lesser charge, but later rejected the plea based
upon information it later received in the presentence
report. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial
court's rejection of the plea agreement and order that he
stand trial placed him twice in jeopardy. The First Circuit
considered the void ab initio analysis and rejected it. It
also considered the possibility of finding that jeopardy did
not attach until the sentence was pronounced, but rejected
that alternative analysis for policy reasons. Finally, it
settled on what we deem to be the most satisfactory analysis.
The court recognized that jeopardy attaches at the time the
guilty plea is accepted. However, it reasoned that nothing
inherent in the double jeopardy clause analysis forbids the
trial court from setting aside the plea and forcing the defendant to trial under appropriate circumstances. The Cruz
court noted that although jeopardy attaches when a jury is
impaneled, if thereafter a mistrial is properly declared, a
defendant may still be retried without violating double
jeopardy. By a parallel of reasoning, the court concluded
that double jeopardy ought not bar trial of a defendant if a
guilty plea is set aside for sufficient reasons. Accordingly,
the court stated:
[J]eopardy attaches upon acceptance of the
guilty plea, but [the constitution]
allow[s] the trial court to rescind its
acceptance at any time before sentencing
and judgment upon a showing of "manifest
necessity"—the standard for declaring a
mistrial over the defendant's objection.
709 F.2d at 114.9
We consider the Cruz court's approach to double
jeopardy to be sound and not so subject to ad hoc manipulations as the void ab initio analysis that fictionalizes
coercion from the fact of a breached promise. Furthermore,
it does not require subsequent resort to due process analysis
to protect the legitimate interests of a defendant against
V. The First Circuit speculated that a weaker standard than
"manifest necessity" might be appropriate where a plea was
set aside, rather than a trial aborted, because double
jeopardy considerations are "less implicated" when dealing
with guilty pleas rather than full-scale trials. However,
the court did not have to consider this issue in depth
because it based its decision to reinstate the plea on the
lower court's direct violation of the federal rule in its use
of the information in the presentence report.
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capricious action by the court or the prosecution in refusing
to abide by plea agreements. Cruz acknowledges that plea
agreements are binding on the parties and the court once the
plea is entered and accepted. If the court or the prosecutor
refuses to comply with the terms of the plea thereafter, the
defendant may choose to withdraw the plea. The trial court
may not refuse to comply with the terms of the accepted agreement unless circumstances justify the declaration of a
misplea;10 otherwise, the double jeopardy clause will preclude
subsequent trial of that defendant. This means, in practice,
that once the court or prosecution has entered into a plea
agreement and that plea has been accepted and entered, neither
one may unilaterally withdraw from the agreement without a
showing that facts analogous to those warranting a mistrial
exist (at least in the absence of a breach of the agreement
by the defendant). This practical constraint should be sufficient to protect against capricious action by the State. At
the same time, by permitting the declaration of a misplea
under appropriate circumstances, the legitimate interest of
the public in assuring that criminal prosecutions are not
frustrated by a clumsy application of the double jeopardy
clause is protected. We therefore choose to employ the Cruz
analysis in considering Kay's federal double jeopardy claim.
The Cruz analysis also seems appropriate in applying
the double jeopardy prohibition under article I, section 12
of the Utah Constitution. There is no Utah case law
discussing when jeopardy attaches as a result of a guilty
plea> nor is there any law as to when guilty pleas may be set
aside without barring retrial; yet these questions are
appropriately answered by Cruz. Therefore, we apply the
analysis used in Cruz in considering Kay's claims under
article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, as well as
under the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution.
Cruz does not deal in depth with the standard that
should be met to justify setting aside a guilty plea and
permitting subsequent trial of a defendant. Thus, we must
10. We recognize that Utah's Rule 11 provides that "if the
judge [after accepting a plea] decides that final disposition
should not be handled in conformity with the plea agreement,
he shall so advise the defendant and then call upon the
defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea." It may be
contended that this provision gives a trial judge carte
blanche to withdraw from a plea bargain at any time. However,
it is elementary that neither rule nor statute may override a
defendant's constitutional right not to be placed twice in
jeopardy. If a court attempted to withdraw from a plea
agreement over a defendant's objection and in the absence of
circumstances warranting a misplea, constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy would preclude his further
prosecution.
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determine when the "manifest necessity" standard used in the
federal courts or the "legal necessity" standard used in the
Utah courts to determine when a trial judge may properly
declare a mistrial over a defendant's objection should be
applied to situations involving guilty pleas. 11
It is generally accepted that a trial court may
properly declare a mistrial upon its own motion and over a
defendant's objection when an error occurs which will
obviously compel reversal if the case is appealed, thus
making further proceedings futile. See, e.g., Illinois v.
Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); Arizona v. Washington, 434
U.S. 497, 505 (1978); State v. Whitman, 93 Utah 2d 557, 74
P.2d 696 (1973); State v. Ambrose, Utah, 598 P.2d 354
(1979). Some courts, in determining whether a mistrial
should be granted, have used a balancing test: the potential
prejudice to the defendant from granting the mistrial and
denying him his "valued right to have his trial completed by
a particular tribunal" is weighed against "the public's
interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments."
Wade y. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 690 (1949), reh'g denied, 337
U.S. 921 (1949); State v. Ambrose, supra. This is to guard
against the prosecution's inviting a mistrial by committing reversible error
when it thinks that the case is going poorly and would prefer
to try again before a new finder of fact. See, e.g., United
States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484-85 (1971); State v. Ambrose,
supra.
The granting of a misplea should be measured by a
similar standard. It is true, as the Cruz court noted, that
double jeopardy considerations are not as heavily implicated
in a plea bargain as in a trial setting. 709 F.2d at 114.
Nonetheless, in light of the double jeopardy problems, considerations of fundamental fairness permeate the cases
involving mistrials. Those considerations are equally applicable to plea bargains. This is best illustrated by the fact
that although the courts have erected few obstacles to the
abrogation of plea bargains under the double jeopardy clause,
11. The Utah cases have referred to a "legal" or "special"
necessity for granting a mistrial over a defendant's
objection, rather than a "manifest" necessity—the phraseology used in the federal courts. Our examination of the
cases reveals no substantial differences between state and
federal courts in the standards for granting a mistrial.
Compare United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 580, 22 U.S.
579 (1824); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1970);
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978), with State
v. Thompson, 58 Utah 291, 199 P. 161 (1921); State v.
Whitman, 93 Utah 2d 557, 74 P.2d 696 (1973); State v.
Ambrose, Utah, 598 P.2d 354, 358-59 (1979); McNair v.
Hayward, Utah, 666 P.2d 321, 324 (1983).
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they have resorted to the due process clause to accomplish
the same end. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,
262-63 (1971); United States v. Mack, 655 F.2d 843 (8th Cir.
1981); United States v. Mercer, 691 F.2d 343 (7th Cir. 1982);
Stowers v. Statey supra, 363 N.E.2d at 983. Therefore, it
seems plain that a misplea can properly be granted where
obvious reversible error has been committed in connection
with the terms or the acceptance of the plea agreement and no
undue prejudice to the defendant is apparent. Declaration of
a misplea also seems reasonable in situations where some
fraud or deception by one party leads to the acceptance of
the plea agreement by the other party or the court. There
may be other circumstances where the balancing of the
interests and legitimate expectations of the defendant and
the public will also warrant a misplea, but we need not reach
that question today.
Applying the foregoing standard, we do not find that
the trial court abused its discretion in declaring a misplea
and ordering Kay either to face sentencing or to withdraw his
plea of guilty. The trial court found that the conditional
plea was illegal. As indicated earlier in this opinion, it
was mistaken on this point. However, Rule 11 certainly was
violated, and had the prosecution timely objection, those
violations would have been grounds to set the plea aside.
The trial court also found that the State had been surprised
by the proposed plea and had disagreed with it. There is
little record support for that finding because most of the
conversation relating to the plea was held off the record.
However, the trial judge is certainly in a better position
than we to know whether the prosecution disagreed with the
proposed agreement. In light of these findings and the
circumstances discussed below, we conclude that the errors
committed by all parties provided ample support for the trial
court's finding of the misplea.
A brief factual review is warranted. Defendant's
counsel initiated the series of errors when he proposed a
plea bargain to the trial court without having first obtained
the State's consent. Under Rule 11, the plea should not have
been tendered to the judge unless the State had previously
agreed to its terms. On the record before us, there is no
evidence that the prosecutor at any time expressly agreed to
the terms of the plea, much less that he agreed to the plea
prior to its presentation to the judge.
The trial court also erred by entertaining the
plea. After the motion to enter a plea was presented to it,
and before proceeding with the in camera hearing, the court
should have ascertained whether the prosecutor had agreed to
the proposed plea. If it determined that the prosecutor had
not agreed in advance, the court should have terminated the
hearing and any further consideration of the plea.
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The problems created by defense counsel and the
trial court were compounded by the prosecution. A timely
objection by the State would have prompted the judge to stop
the proceedings and would have obviated the resulting problems. In the very unlikely event that the judge refused to
halt the proceeding, the State could have asked for a recess,
contacted any member of this Court, and obtained a temporary
stay of the plea proceeding pending procurement of a writ of
prohibition. See United States v. Werker, supra, 535 F.2d at
201. The prosecution took none of the steps described. In
fact, despite its current protestations, its actions at the
time of the plea and confession suggest that it may have
acquiesced in the plea bargain, although the trial judge
seems to have expressly found to the contrary.12 In any
event, the prosecution's vacillating performance does not
change our conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in declaring a "misplea" and setting the plea
agreement aside.
IV
Finally, we consider Kay's contention that
considerations of fundamental fairness embodied in the due
process clause of amendment XIV of the United States
Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution require specific enforcement of the plea. He
argues that he acted in reliance on the promise that he would
not be sentenced to death if he entered a guilty plea and
gave a full confession. The confession was given, and
although it would not be admissible at a subsequent trial, it
has provided the prosecution with a road map if he should now
be forced to go to trial. He contends that to require him to
go to trial under such circumstances would be manifestly
unfair, especially since he was induced to give the confession
by the court's broken promise.
12. While Kay tendered his motion for acceptance of the
pleas unilaterally, the motion was discussed with the court
and the State in chambers for over an hour. A recess was
called, another short in camera proceeding was held with all
counsel present, and proceedings were then held on the
record. The State failed to object at any time during the
record proceedings, despite the trial court's repeated
inquiries to the State's counsel. The inference that can be
drawn from this record, and from the State's subsequently
raising the issue only after a new lead counsel's appearance
and after defendant's open court confession had thoroughly
inflamed the public, is that the State initially acquiesced
in the plea agreement. Although the trial court found that
the State was surprised by the conditional plea and did not
agree to it, we are deeply troubled by the prosecution's
conduct.
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In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63
(1971)f the Supreme Court expressly recognized that, as a
matter of due process, a defendant who pleads guilty has a
constitutional right to a remedy when that agreement is
broken. However, the Court refused to decide whether the
appropriate remedy should be withdrawal of the plea or
specific enforcement, leaving that question for the state
court to resolve based on the facts of the case. Id. Since
Santobello, numerous state and federal courts have considered
the appropriate remedy for a broken plea bargain. When a
defendant has taken steps in reliance on a plea bargain that
may prejudice him at a subsequent trial, many courts have
granted specific enforcement of the plea agreement. See,
e.g., Santobello v. New York, supra; United States v. Mack,
655 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Mercer, 691
F.2d 343 (7th Cir. 1982); Unites States v. Blackwell, supra,
694 F.2d at 1337; Phillips v. United States, 679 F.2d 192
(9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Cruz, 709 F.2d 111 (1st
Cir. 1983); Stowers v. State, supra, 393 N.E.2d at 983. We
choose not to follow that route.
As noted earlier, the Cruz double jeopardy analysis
can take adequate cognizance of the fundamental fairness
concerns that are ordinarily brought into play under the due
process clause in connection with broken plea agreements.
Those considerations were taken into account in our conclusion that the grant of the misplea was not an abuse of
discretion. There is no reason to reach a different conclusion under the due process clause of either the state or
the federal constitution. It is true that Kay confessed
because of the plea agreement. However, that confession
certainly cannot be used at a subsequent trial since he was
misled into giving it. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S.
220 (1927). This places Kay in no different position than
any other defendant who gives a confession that is later
found not to have been knowing and voluntary. The confession
is excluded, but nothing precludes trial of the defendant.
The judge at a subsequent trial must assure that the prosecution makes no use of the confession or any evidence derived
from it. But the speculative value of a "road map" is not
enough to preclude prosecution.
It must be borne in mind that Kay proposed the plea
and the terms under which it was given. In doing so, he
acted in violation of Rule 11 and generated a number of the
ensuing problems. It would be anomolous to hold that because
he and his counsel were able to draw the court and the
prosecution into a proceeding in violation of Rule 11, he is
constitutionally entitled to the benefit of his bargain.
We have considered Kay's other contentions on appeal
and find them to be without merit.
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The case is remanded. Kay may either withdraw the
guilty pleas that were given as part of the aborted plea
agreement and enter new pleas or he may choose to stand on
his guilty pleas and proceed to sentencing under the
provisions of section 76-3-207 with no guarantee as to
sentence.

I CONCUR:

Christine M. Durham, Justice

HALL, Chief Justice:
I join the
court which vacated
guilty. However, I
tation of the scope
bargaining.

(Concurring in the result)

Court in affirming the order
the condition imposed by the
do not join the Court in its
of judicial participation in

of the trial
pleas of
interpreplea

Judicial participation in plea bargaining is
expressly prohibited by Rule 11(f), Utah R. Crim. P.,1 which
reads in pertinent part as follows:
(f) The judge shall not participate in
plea discussions prior to any agreement
being made by the prosecuting attorney, but
once a tentative plea agreement has been
reached which contemplates entry of a plea
in the expectation that other charges will
be dropped or dismissed, the judge, upon
request of the parties, may permit the
disclosure to him of such tentative
agreement and the reasons therefor in
advance of the time for tender of the
plea. The judge may then indicate to the
prosecuting attorney and defense counsel
whether he will approve the proposed
disposition. Thereafter, if the judge
decides that final disposition should not
be handled in conformity with the plea
agreement, he shall so advise the defendant
and then call upon the defendant to either
affirm or withdraw his plea.
(Emphasis added.)
T.

U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-11 (1982 ed.).
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The foregoing statute does not encompass or
contemplate a role-change on the part of the judge. On the
contrary, the statute precludes the judge from becoming a
plea bargainer, a role wholly inconsistent and in conflict
with the role exclusively reserved to one who must sit in
judgment* This concept of the role the judge must play is
further borne out by subsection (e)(6) of Rule 11. That rule
provides that if recommendations as to sentence are allowed
by the court, the court shall advise the defendant personally
that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the
court.
Utah's Rule 11 is patterned after Rule 11, Fed. R.
Crim. P., which has similarly been interpreted as prohibiting
judicial participation in plea bargaining. In United States
v. Werkerf2 the court had this to say about the role of the
judge in plea bargaining:
Rule 11 implicitly recognizes that
participation in the plea bargaining
process depreciates the image of the trial
judge that is necessary to public
confidence in the impartial and objective
administration of criminal justice. As a
result of his participation, the judge is
no longer a judicial officer or a neutral
arbiter. Rather, he becomes or seems to
become an advocate for the resolution he
has suggested to the defendant.

. . . The Rule is based on the sound
principle that the interests of justice
are best served if the judge remains aloof
from all discussions preliminary to the
determination of guilt or innocence so
that his impartiality and objectivity
shall not be open to any question or
suspicion when it becomes his duty to
impose sentence.3
In State v. Jordan,* the Arizona Supreme Court
observed that under its rule5 the "court shall not
participate" in plea negotiations. The court said that the
sound reason for the rule was that set forth in Werker: that
a judge who participates in plea bargaining is thereby
T. 535 F.2d 198 (2nd Cir.)f cert- denied, 429 U.S. 926
(1976).
3. Id. at 203.
4. 137 Ariz. 504, 508-09, 672 P.2d 169, 173-74 (1983).
5. 17 A.R.S. Ariz. R. Crim. P., Rule 17.-4(a).
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deprived of judicial status and can no longer perform as a
neutral arbiter.
U.C.A., 1953, § 76-3-206 provides that one
"convicted of a capital felony shall be sentenced in accordance with section 76-3-207, and sentence shall be death or
life imprisonment as the court or jury, in accordance with
this section, shall determine.*
Predicated upon the rule that prohibits judicial
participation in plea bargaining, U.C.A., 1953, § 76-3-207(1)
(Supp. 1985) mandates that a "sentencing proceeding" follow
the entry of a plea of guilty or conviction of a capital
felony. That section reads in pertinent part as follows:
(1) When a defendant has pled guilty
to or been found guilty of a capital
felony, there shall be further proceedings
before the court or jury on the issue of
sentence. In the case of a plea of guilty
to a capital felony, the sentencing
proceedings shall be conducted by the
court which accepted the plea or by a jury
upon request of the defendant. . • .
(2) In these sentencing proceedings,
evidence may be presented as to any matter
the court deems relevant to sentence,
including but not limited to the nature
and circumstances of the crime, the
defendant's character, background,
history, mental and physical condition,
and any other facts in aggravation or
mitigation of the penalty.
(Emphasis added.)
It does not lie within the prerogative of the court
to disregard the mandate of a sentencing hearing. The court
is required to consider the evidence to determine whether the
penalty to be imposed is that of death or life imprisonment.
Furthermore, agreeing to be bound to impose a life sentence
in advance of a sentencing hearing constitutes prejudgment of
the issue of sentencing. It is an arbitrary and injudicious
act which violates the holding in Furman v. Georgia^ that the
decision to impose the death penalty shall not be left to the
uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries.
In light of the explicit statutory procedures to be
followed in capital felony cases, it clearly appears that the
defendant led the trial judge into error by engaging him in a
6.

408 U.S. 238 (1972).

unilateral plea bargain arrangement whereby pleas of guilty
were exchanged for a promise of life imprisonment. The manifest error rendered the guilty pleas void ab initio and not
merely voidable. The court was without power to accept the
conditional pleas. The pleas were therefore void and without
legal effect. The pleas were not binding, and either party
was free to withdraw from them. Consequently, the acceptance
of the pleas did not place the defendant in jeopardy within
the meaning of the sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution or article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution. Not having been placed in jeopardy, the
defendant may be tried on the charges to which the void pleas
were entered. Of course, on remand, defendant has the option
of proceeding with a sentencing hearing or standing trial on
reinstated pleas of not guilty.
The main opinion boldly asserts, without
documentation, that judicial involvement in plea bargaining
is widespread in this jurisdiction. I am not so persuaded,
particularly because no such instances of judicial impropriety have surfaced in any of the cases previously decided
by this Court. However, even assuming that such impropriety
is indeed prevalent, I deem it far more appropriate to
squarely meet the issue rather than sanction the practice as
"harmless error" and simply hope that the evil will go away.

STEWART, Justice: (Concurring in result and concurring in
the opinion in part)
I concur in Parts I and II of the plurality opinion,
and I concur in the result of the opinion but on somewhat
different grounds. The key question in this case is not the
validity of the defendant's plea of guilty, but the
enforceability of the condition attached to the plea. The
trial judge made an agreement with the defendant that he
would plead guilty to a capital homicide charge and in return
the trial judge would sentence the defendant to life
imprisonment, a lawful sentence in a capital homicide case.
The trial judge has now reneged on that agreement and given
the defendant the choice of either withdrawing his guilty
plea and pleading not guilty or of standing on his plea of
guilty and going to a penalty hearing to determine whether he
will be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. The
defendant seeks to have the Court direct the trial court to
sentence the defendant to life imprisonment pursuant to the
terms of the agreement.
The issue is whether due process requires the trial
court to perform the agreement and sentence the defendant to
life imprisonment. In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,
262 (1971), the Supreme Court held with respect to a plea
No. 20265
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bargain broken by the government that it is for the
courts to determine whether a defendant is entitled
specific enforcement of the plea bargain or whether
only entitled to withdraw his guilty plea and go to
the crime charged•

state
to
he is
trial on

In the instant case the condition attached to the
defendant's guilty plea was proposed by the defendant, not
the prosecutor or the trial judge. Although it was the
defendant who was the prime mover in the whole affair, the
prosecution clearly acquiesced in the agreement, at least as
far as the record shows. Nevertheless, I submit that the
trial judge's decision to refuse to enforce the condition of
the plea was not error in these circumstances. Rule 11 of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states that even after a
plea bargain has been accepted by the court, "if the judge
decides that final disposition should not be handled in
conformity with the plea agreement, he shall so advise the
defendant and thus call upon the defendant to either affirm
or withdraw his plea." A number of reasons justify giving
the trial judge such discretion up to the time of sentence.
But after sentence has been pronounced, the trial judge may
not then rescind the sentence, absent fraud or failure of the
defendant to abide by the terms of the agreement. I do not
believe that this rule violates the Due Process Clause under
the ruling in Santobello, at least on the facts of this
case.
If the defendant withdraws his guilty plea, as he
may do under the trial court's order, he waives his right
against double jeopardy and is no worse off than he was
before he sought to protect himself from the death penalty by
his aborted plea bargain, except that he has given a
confession, which, for reasons explained by Justice
Zimmerman, is not, in my view, prejudicial.

HOWE, Justice:

(Concurring in the Result)

I concur in the result. While I agree with much of
the "misplea" analysis of the majority opinion, I prefer to
rest my concurrence on the ground that Rule 11 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure does not authorize a plea
agreement between the defendant and the judge concerning the
sentence to be imposed. Subsections (e)(6) and (f) of that
rule provide:
(e)(6) If it appears that the
prosecuting attorney or any other party
has agreed to request or recommend the
acceptance of a plea to a lesser included
offense, or the dismissal of other
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charges, the same shall be approved by the
court. If recommendations as to sentence
are allowed by the court, the court shall
advise the defendant personally that any
recommendation as to sentence is not
binding on the court.
(f) The judge shall not participate
in plea discussions prior to an agreement
being made by the prosecuting attorney,
but once a tentative plea agreement has
been reached which contemplates entry of a
plea in the expectation that other charges
will be dropped or dismissed, the judge,
upon request of the parties, may permit
the disclosure to him of such tentative
agreement and the reasons therefore in
advance of the time for tender of the
plea. A judge may then indicate to the
prosecuting attorney and defense counsel
whether he will approve the proposed
disposition. Thereafter, if the judge
decides that final disposition should not
be handled in conformity with the plea
agreement, he shall so advise the
defendant and then call upon the defendant
to either affirm or withdraw his plea.
It is to be noted that these subsections authorize
only plea agreements between the prosecution and the
defendant for the entry of a plea to a lesser included
offense in the expectation that other charges will be dropped
or dismissed. There is nothing in the language of the
subsections which would authorize a plea agreement with the
prosecution or the judge based on the sentence to be
imposed. To the contrary, subsection (e)(6) states that if
in the disclosure to the court, a recommendation as to
sentencing appears, the court shall advise the defendant
personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not
binding on the court.
The agreement made by the trial judge here to impose
a life sentence is not authorized by Rule 11 and thus is not
enforceable by either the defendant or the court. Furthermore, even if the agreement were authorized, the last
sentence of Rule 11(f) gives the judge the right to rescind
his approval of it before sentencing. Thus, I conclude that
the judge was free to withdraw from the agreement prior to
the time that sentencing was actually pronounced. Due
process, however, demands that the defendant who was lead
into pleading guilty upon the sentencing agreement of the
judge now be allowed to withdraw his plea should he so
desire. United States v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244
No. 20265
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(S.D.N.Y. 1966). Should the defendant elect to do so, the
trial court can take such prophylactic measures as are
necessary to afford the defendant a fair trial untainted by
knowledge of the making and withdrawal of the guilty plea.
This result, i.e., that the agreement is
unenforceable (but not void) and that the trial judge may
withdraw from any promise made as to sentencing before
sentencing is actually pronounced, will not result in the
mischief feared by the majority opinion. A defendant who has
been sentenced in accordance with a judge's plea agreement
has no complaint. He has received the benefit of an executed
agreement and would not be freed for nothing more than
technical errors. The trial judge here was fortunate to have
detected his error before sentencing and should be allowed to
withdraw from his commitment provided he restores the
defendant to his original position without prejudice.

25

W#-s

-*nnre

APPENDIX B

C.

THE APPROPRIATE RELIEF IS TO AFFIRM THE LOWER
COURT'S ORDER VACATING THE CONDITION OF
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEAS, AND TO REQUIRE
REMEDIAL MEASURES TO ENSURE THE DEFENDANT
A FAIR TRIAL OR THE STATE A FAIR CAPITAL
SENTENCING PROCEEDING.

Defendant's request for the relief of "specific
performance" of the condition of his guilty plea based upon contract
theories such as detrimental reliance, expressed and mutual promises,
breach of contract, etc. is meritless.
privy to any contract.

The State certainly was not

And if the judge is viewed as the other

contracting party, its action in entering into the contract was
unlawful per ££. under the previously cited authorities.

Defendant

created, the error by proposing a contract that was void ah initio.
At best, he detrimentally relied on his own illegal plea which he
unilaterally created, proposed and filed.
The appropriate relief in this case is an affirmance of the
lower court's order vacating the condition of the plea, coupled with
suitable prophylactic measures to ensure the defendant and the State
fair proceedings as the case proceeds either to trial or sentencing.
To this end the State asks that this Court direct that a new judge
hear all future proceedings on this case.

The State has twice

suggested and once formally petitioned for the recusal of the present
district judge due to the events which have transpired (TR. 9/12/84,
29, 81-82; R.III, 29). To date, he has not recused himself or
directed a recusal hearing before another judge.
-34-

Be has been recused

from hearing the co-defendant's companion case (State v. Newstead.
Pifth District Court Crim. No. 997).
The case authority previously cited makes clear that a
trial judge's impermissible involvement in the plea bargaining
process so taints the proceedings that the judge is effectively
unable to continue on the case.

The perception of judicial

neutrality and the maintenance of public confidence in the
proceedings is paramount, and the mere appearance of judicial
impartiality is normally sufficient for recusal,

in re Murchison.

349 U.S. 133 (1955); Haslam v. Morrison. 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520
(1948); State v. Byington. 114 Utah 388, 200 P.2d 723, 726, 5 A.L.R.
1393 (1948); cf. 28 U.S.C.S. S§ 144, 455 as construed in United
States v. Gigayr 605 F.2d 507 (10th Cir. 1979) (test for recusal is
whether the circumstances are such as to create in the mind of a
reasonable man a suspicion of partiality even though no actual bias
on prejudice exists).

in United States v. Werker, jsjiBia, 535 F.2d at 204, the
reviewing court suggested that where plea offers involving judges
break down and the case goes to trial, "the question then arises
whether the judge should preside at trial," he being "steeped in the
knowledge of ttlhe defendant's] guilt."

Id. at 204. The court

concluded that "lulnder such circumstances many judges would feel
that they should recuse themselves from presiding at the trial." Id.
Similarly, the courts in United States v. Adams. 634 F.2d
830 (5th Cir. 1981) and People v. Clark. Colo, 515 P.2d 1243 (1973),
after condemning conditional pleas of guilty with judges or similar
impermissible judicial involvement in the plea bargaining process,
ordered that further proceedings on remand be before a new judge.

-35-

The present posture of the instant casef being a capital
one, presents even far more compelling reasons for recusal than
existed in any of the above-cited cases.

Due to the developments

surrounding the taking of the conditional pleas, the defendant's
confession relative thereto, the court's subsequent vacating of the
condition originally attached to such plea, as well as other events
which have since transpired, it is virtually certain that should the
case proceed to penalty before this judge, the guilty pleas
themselves will later be challenged on appeal.

In order to safeguard

and ensure the voluntariness and validity of such pleas, and to
dissipate the taint of any promise, express or implied, regarding the
sentence which defendant might receive, it is absolutely imperative
that the case be handled from this point by another judge, who would
be entirely independent and removed from all prior representations
and proceedings.

Only after being fully informed that a penalty

hearing would proceed before a different judge will this defendant's
decision to stand upon his former pleas rather than to withdraw thembe deemed wholly voluntary and made with full knowledge of potential
consequences.

The defendant's decision on whether to stand on his

pleas at this point could well be contingent on whether he feels he
will be sentenced by the judge whom he alleges is contractually
obligated to sentence him to life or by a judge with whom he can
claim no such prior agreement.
The lower court is essentially in a no-win situation if it
proceeds to sentencing.

If evidence presented at the penalty hearing

persuades the judge to sentence the defendant to death,"serious
appellate concerns will be built into the record, injecting into the
appellate process a substantial issue which can and should be avoided
by proper prophylactic measures at this point in the proceedings.
-36-

Iff on the other hand, the present judge hears the penalty
phase evidence and sentences the defendant to lifer serious problems
still remain.

First, as mentioned above, a challenge can still lie

as to the validity of the pleas themselves, having arguably been
induced pursuant to an express condition that defendant not receive
the death penalty.

Notwithstanding the lower court's later order

t

vacating such condition, where the same judge sits at the penalty
phase, there is no way to effectively dissipate the taint of the
prior judicial involvement.

Note that U.C.A. S 77-35-11 specifically

mandates that where plea bargain with the prosecution includes a
recommendation as to sentence, "the court shall advise the defendant
personally that any recommendation as to sentencing is not binding on
the court."

Where a sentencing arrangement has previously been made,

not with the prosecution, but with the judge himself, nothing short
of recusal and the substitution of a completely independent and
detached judge will re-establish the proper neutral posture of the
sentencing authority.
Secondly, it is virtually certain should the lower court
hand down life sentences that public doubts will be raised as to
whether it was in part or in whole the product of the prior agreement
rather than a truly independent judicial decision.
Jordan, Ariz., 672 P.2d 169 (1983).

See state v.

In order to avoid the situation

where the court, although acting in good faith, will be perceived to
have been improperly influenced, an independent judge who will not be
subject to such public suspicion should sit and determine penalty.
The State has additional concerns.

At the August 22nd

hearing, the defendant gave a statement under oath regarding his
involvement in the homicides.

Such statement, being in the context

of a plea rather than of a trial or penalty hearing, was taken to
-37-

establish a factual basis for the plea and was thus without crossexamination by the State.

The possibility of the lower court

considering this statement in mitigation of the death penalty is
clearly present, yet to do so would be a consideration of matters
outside the penalty hearing record.

The defendant could choose not

to*1 take the stand at the penalty proceedings and effectively insulate
himself from cross-examination by the State on the content of his
prior statement.

Statements (or "confessions11) given in the context

of a plea are suspect, and often self-serving.

It is difficult to

assess whether the statement was accurate or whether defendant was
simply mouthing what he thought necessary to obtain the benefit of
the conditional pleas.

In such situations reviewing courts have

found that the inducements regarding sentencing render such
statements questionable at best.

In People v. Earegood. Mich., 162

N.W.2d 802 815 n.19 (1968), the court noted:
"The defendant Earegood described his
acts of participation in the crime before
the judge accepted his plea of guilty to the
reduced offense. . . . Those statements may
have been accurate; on the other hand, they may
have been made in order to justify the trial
judge in accepting the plea. . . .
Id. at 815.
The argument is all the more compelling in a capital case.
No stronger inducement can be contemplated than the prospect of
saving one's own life, and statements given specifically conditioned
so as to avoid the punishment of death can scarcely be considered to
demonstrate candor, remorse, a clean breast, or anything else in
defendant's favor.

Yet, if the present judge remains on this case,

the prior statement, without benefit of impeachment, could be
considered in mitigation.

The delicate balancing process of weighing

aggravating and mitigating circumstances in any capital sentencing

proceeding provided for in D.C.A. S 76-3-207 (1953), as amended, has
been so compromised in this case as to require an alternate
sentencing authority to sit at any penalty hearing.
In the interest of sound administration of justice, this
case must proceed from this point before a different judge.12

12
A separate ground for recusal is that the district judge, at a
hearing in open court, publicly expressed its unequivocal opinion that
one of the State's witness, Renada Pasqua, had lied in her testimony
before the court at a prior hearing (TR. 9/19/84, 10-11). He not only
expressed his opinion that her testimony was unworthy of belief, but
that he felt she should be prosecuted for her involvement in the
crime.
-'ao-

